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INTRODUCTION
The history of Anglo-American securities law is much lengthier than
one might imagine.1  It dates, at least, to the thirteenth-century trading of
bonds and securities of government-sanctioned corporations in England.2
By 1700, there was English legislation specially designed “to protect inves-
tors against unscrupulous manipulation by stock jobbers and stock bro-
kers.”3  There is no evidence, however, that any American colony enacted
securities laws or regulations before the American Revolution.4
Around the time of the American Revolution, there were thriving
stock exchanges in several major colonial port cities.5  Philadelphia had
the largest exchange in the colonies, followed closely by New York.6  Fol-
lowing the English tradition, these exchanges met in coffee houses.7  In
New York, for example, the coffee house primarily used by brokers was
aptly named the “Merchant’s Coffee House.”8  These stock exchanges
* John I. Sanders is an associate at Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP. His
practice focuses on business and finance, securities, and mergers and acquisitions.
1. See, e.g., Securities Law History, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www
.law.cornell.edu/wex/securities_law_history (last visited Feb. 1, 2016) (explaining, quite mis-
takenly, that securities law history is primarily the study of the New Deal statutes with some
background material pulled from the Blue Sky laws) [hereinafter Cornell History].
2. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, BROKER-DEALER REGULATION IN A NUTSHELL 13 (2d ed.
2011).
3. Id.
4. Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence, 75
WASH. U. L. REV. 849 (1997).
5. Andrew Beattie, The Birth of the Stock Exchanges, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.in
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seem to have operated smoothly until a stock manipulation scandal roiled
the New York market in 1792, inspiring a legislative response that would
forever change the trajectory of American securities law.9
This Comment outlines the circular path of American securities law—
one that begins and ends with the primacy of self-regulation.  Part I of this
paper describes American securities law between 1792 and 1911 (the “But-
tonwood Era”).  In this era, a group of New York stock brokers utilized
private contract law to create securities regulation for their private club,
thereby establishing a tradition of self-regulation.  Part II describes a short
period of history in which individual states attempted to regulate the se-
curities market through state statutes, the so-called “Blue Sky Laws.”  Part
III details the creation of the federal securities law regime during the New
Deal Era.  Part IV describes the transition from centralized federal regula-
tion of the securities industry to the return of the primacy of self-regula-
tion.  Part V serves as the paper’s conclusion.
PART I: THE BUTTONWOOD ERA AND THE FOUNDATIONS
OF SELF-REGULATION
The New York stock broker scandal of 1792 brought about the first
known securities law in American history.10  The statute, passed by New
York’s legislature and signed into law by Governor George Clinton on
April 10, 1792, was titled “An Act to prevent the pernicious practice of
Stock-Jobbing, and for regulating sales and public auctions.”11  The statute
was designed to restrict the trade of stocks by unscrupulous persons.12  To
that end, it limited the number of public auctioneers to no more than
twenty-four at a time.13  As a result, the statute immediately created a
schism within the community of stock brokers in New York City.
Before the New York legislature successfully passed the April 1792
statute, a small group of stock brokers responded to the scandal by insti-
tuting a new public stock exchange at 22 Wall Street in March of 1792.14
When the New York statute severely limited the public auctioning of
stocks, however, the brokers devised a new plan.15  They met at Corre’s
Hotel to draft an agreement that would create and govern a private stock
exchange.16  This agreement—now known as the Buttonwood Agree-
ment—began the American securities law tradition of self-regulation.17
9. See generally Banner, supra note 4, at 850.
10. See Id.
11. N.Y. LAWS, 15th Sess., ch. 62 (1792).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. ROBERT IRVING WARSHOW, THE STORY OF WALL STREET 31 (1931).
15. N.Y. LAWS, supra note 11.
16. WARSHOW, supra note 14, at 32.
17. Daniel Gallagher, Time for a Fresh Look at Equity Market Structure and Self-Reg-
ulation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 19, 2012), https://
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Under the Buttonwood Agreement, the exchange members adopted
the principles of New York contract law to regulate their new private ex-
change.18  The terms of the agreement were quite short, consisting of a
single paragraph.19  The terms stated that the twenty-four signatories
would charge a set minimum rate in the trading of stock and give each
other preference in the trading of stock.20  The agreement also “effectively
limited membership . . . to the wealthier financiers in New York,” who
would provide regular market liquidity.21
The key to the agreement was a set of three principles.  The first princi-
ple was to list stocks for sale on the exchange that were actually marketa-
ble (i.e., desirable).  Due to the wealth and influence of its members, the
market governed by the Buttonwood Agreement attracted the issuers nec-
essary to achieve this goal.22  The second crucial aspect of the agreement
was its prohibition of extra-exchange dealing by member brokers.  The
text of the Buttonwood Agreement “wouldn’t allow brokers to trade listed
securities anywhere except the exchange.”23  The third pivotal element of
the agreement was the tight control of broker membership in the ex-
change.  From the beginning, “[t]he ‘private club’ character of the Ex-
change made no guarantee of admission” and barred bad actors.24  By
regulating itself according to these principles, the exchange became the
dominant securities market in the United States.25
While a substantial portion of the “public stock” traded in the years
between the American Revolution and the War of 1812 was “the same as
modern government bonds,” bank shares were occasionally traded as
well.26  Many of the listed securities had connections to the era’s most
prominent politicians, and these connections were a source of great in-
trigue.  Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton, for instance, had connec-
tions to bond syndicates in New York, Philadelphia, and Boston.27
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/10/19/time-for-a-fresh-look-at-equity-market-structure-and-
self-regulation/.
18. Richard G. Kethum, The Fifth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate,
Securities & Financial Law, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 203 (2005).
19. RICHARD J. TEWELES, EDWARD S. BRADLEY & TED TEWELES, THE STOCK MAR-
KET 109 (6th ed. 1992).
20. Id.
21. Jerry W. Markham, High-Speed Trading on Stock and Commodity Markets – From
Courier Pigeons to Computers, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 578 (2015).
22. Gallagher, supra note 17.
23. Floyd Norris, ICE Deal for NYSE Creates Global Powerhouse, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/21/business/global/ice-deal-for-nyse-creates-
global-powerhouse.html?_r=0.
24. Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading, Chinese Walls, and Brokerage Commis-
sions: The Origins of Modern Regulation of Information Flows in Securities Markets, 4 J. L.
ECON. & POL’Y. 311, 319 (2008).
25. Beattie, supra note 5, at 3.
26. WARSHOW, supra note 14, at 31.
27. Id. at 23.
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Additionally, his chief legislative aide in the United States Senate, Robert
Morris, was the head of the largest syndicate.28  Possessing material non-
public information, these gentlemen were rumored to make millions of
dollars off of securities market transactions.29
Despite opposition, government and Wall Street continued to inter-
mingle in ways that might seem unconscionable to modern Americans.30
For example, Hamilton’s service as Secretary of the Treasury “made it pos-
sible for his friends and political allies to make millions” off of material
non-public information.31  His political opponents, not to be outdone,
opened rival trading operations on Wall Street.32  The man who would
later kill Alexander Hamilton in a duel, Aaron Burr, opened the Manhat-
tan Company at 23 Wall Street for that very purpose in the 1790s.33  Per-
haps the success of early American political leaders within the securities
market is one reason the tradition of self-regulation went unchecked.
Despite the pervasive use of insider information, the 1792 Buttonwood
Agreement “was stringently enforced” by its members.34  As scholar Rob-
ert Warshow notes, “So effective were its provisions, that not until 1817
was any more formal or detailed written agreement considered neces-
sary.”35  Changes in stock market regulation were finally shown to be nec-
essary by the advent of demands associated with the War of 1812.  The
flurry of issuances and activity on the exchange during the war elevated
the exchange’s profile. The New York Commercial Advertiser, a newspa-
per, began to carry a complete listing of exchange quotations in 1815.36
The exchange list included government bonds as well as stocks of at least
seven banks and a manufacturing company.37
Some exchange members believed reforms were necessary to deal with
the higher demand for federal debt securities catalyzed by the War of
1812.38  On February 25, 1817, a resolution changed the name of the ex-
change to the New York Stock Exchange Board (“NYSE”).39  On May
8th, a new board of directors was elected and new rules were written for
28. Id. at 26.
29. Id. (citing a New York Daily Advertiser article claiming that Robert Morris alone
stood to make $18,000,000 off of one deal).
30. Id. at 35–36 (naming James Madison and Thomas Jefferson as among the most
vocal critics).
31. Id. at 50.
32. Id. at 43–44.
33. Id. at 47.
34. Id. at 32.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 59.
37. Id. at 60.
38. See Stuart Banner, The Origins of the New York Stock Exchange, 1791–1860, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 113, 115 (1998).
39. WARSHOW, supra note 14, at 60.
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the NYSE.40  These new rules, numbering seventeen in all, are known as
the “1817 Constitution.”41
The 1817 Constitution departed from the Buttonwood Agreement by
including specific rules “to govern trading and admission of new mem-
bers.”42  It also gave the NYSE, for the first time, the ability to discipline
its members for misconduct.43  Specifically, the new rules held that “mem-
bers could be fined for certain infractions” and that “any member who did
not comply with [NYSE] rules could be expelled with a two-thirds vote of
the membership.”44
Through the nineteenth century, the role of the NYSE in the national
economy greatly expanded.45  Increased listings, volumes of trades, and
membership were met in turn with heightened NYSE self-regulation.
During the nineteenth century, the NYSE operated a “miniature legal sys-
tem.”46  The agreement between members and the NYSE guaranteed bro-
kers orderly executions of transactions, assurance of the counterparty’s
creditworthiness, access to knowledge about the market, and a ready
mechanism for resolving disputes.47  As before, the NYSE relied on New
York state contract law to enforce these rules.48
Notably, the particular rules adopted by the NYSE during the nine-
teenth century share similarities with modern securities law.  The NYSE
had “its own rules governing securities trading and its own mechanism for
resolving trade-related disputes.”49  Additionally, it ordained a body
called the Governing Committee to exercise legislative, judicial, and exec-
utive power within the NYSE.50  This body was known to require “more
rigid obedience to its doctrines than any governmental banking depart-
ment” of the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries.51
The Governing Committee acted forcefully in the nineteenth century
to maintain the NYSE’s reputation as a high-quality business when the
“more speculative [stocks] were driven off the NYSE . . . by the NYSE’s
40. Id. at 61.
41. See Banner, supra note 38, at 115.
42. Id. at 115.
43. Alan Lawhead, Useful Limits to the Fifth Amendment, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
210, 214–15 (2009).
44. Id.
45. See Banner, supra note 38, at 119.
46. Id. at 132.
47. Id. at 120–21, 123, 125.
48. See William I. Friedman, The Fourteenth Amendment’s Public/Private Distinction
Among Securities Regulators in the U.S. Marketplace – Revisited, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING &
FIN. L. 727, 728 (2004).
49. Banner, supra note 38, at 132.
50. WARSHOW, supra note 14, at 344.
51. See id. at 344.
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high-cost commission structure.”52  In light of this phenomenon, the
NYSE adopted one of its most significant quality control rules in 1863.53
The rule required listed companies to “disclose financial information, op-
erate with more transparency, associate with local bankers, and issue an-
nual reports.”54  Ultimately, the NYSE began to specify “certain minimum
behavioral and reporting requirements that each issuer must meet before
the [NYSE] would even consider listing” the issuer’s securities.55  By the
end of the nineteenth century, “listing on the NYSE came to represent a
sort of ‘NYSE-seal-of-approval’ ” that unsophisticated investors could rely
on.56  Evidence suggests that these efforts to vet issuers were quite
successful.57
The NYSE also adopted rules that enhanced market integrity.  For ex-
ample, brokers were required to “stand by their posts on a regular basis”
to make a market (i.e., stand ready to trade) in the listed securities.58  This
requirement remained as operating hours expanded59 so that the NYSE
operated on a “dependable, continuing basis.”60  Another rule enhancing
market integrity stated that those engaging in fictitious trades would be
expelled.61
Of course, it was not always a world of law and order at the NYSE.
The nineteenth century gave rise to the first market manipulators and the
first known short-sellers.62  In this environment, the sophisticated process
of justice envisioned by NYSE rules did not always come to fruition.  After
falling victim to a swindle, for example, Cornelius Vanderbilt wrote the
following note to a member of the NYSE: “Gentlemen, you have under-
taken to cheat me.  I will not sue you because the law takes too long.  I will
ruin you.  Sincerely yours, Cornelius Vanderbilt.”63
Those individuals with greater patience than Vanderbilt had the option
of bringing a claim before the NYSE’s membership or the New York state
court.  While both options were available, the NYSE “represented an al-
ternative to the official legal system that was probably faster and less
52. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the
State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 36 n.107 (2001).
53. See Brian Murphy, The Rise of an American Institution: The Stock Market, GILDER
LEHRMAN INST. OF AM. HISTORY, https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/economics/
essays/rise-american-institution- stock-market (last visited Jan. 12, 2016).
54. Id.
55. Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of the
National Market System, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 315, 317 (1985).
56. Id.
57. See WARSHOW, supra note 14, at 344.
58. Macey & Haddock, supra note 55, at 317.
59. WARSHOW, supra note 14, at 70.
60. Macey & Haddock, supra note 55, at 317.
61. Banner, supra note 38, at 139.
62. WARSHOW, supra note 14, at 63–64.
63. Id. at 89.
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costly, and in which one was assured of more knowledgeable decision
makers.”64
Those who chose to bring a claim in New York state courts found the
NYSE was given special deference.  In fact, New York state courts ex-
pressly affirmed the power of the NYSE to make and enforce private se-
curities laws.65  Accordingly, appeals of the NYSE’s decisions were
“strictly limited.”66  An appeal would fail so long as the NYSE had acted
within its own constitution and with good faith.67  The basis of this view
was that the NYSE’s identity as a “voluntary association of individuals”
with freedom of contract required the court’s recognition and respect.68
History reveals that the nineteenth century was a period in which the
NYSE had no regulatory rival in local, state, or federal government.  In
1836, for example, the New York Senate passed a bill that “would have
prohibited the NYSE from closing its trading sessions to non-member
traders.”69  The NYSE, however, prevented this result by sending mem-
bers to Albany to lobby against the bill.70  On several more occasions “in
the 1830s and 1840s, the NYSE succeeded in defeating similar bills.”71
Thus, the tradition of self-regulation was reinforced throughout the nine-
teenth century.
The Buttonwood Agreement “established the NYSE as a self-regula-
tory organization controlled by its membership.”72  Its apparent success
and the efforts of its members to prevent legislative interference estab-
lished self-regulation as an unquestioned tradition in the United States’
primary securities market.  The primacy of self-regulation only came into
question after a series of public scandals harmed middle-class Americans.
Such scandals swept across the country in the early years of the twentieth
century and spurred state legislatures to undertake earnest regulation of
the securities industry for the first time.
PART II: THE BLUE SKY LAWS ERA
For well over a century, the NYSE remained a relatively exclusive club
capable of resisting “the efforts of outsiders to dictate its policy or of gov-
ernmental agencies to supervise its activities.”73  At the start of the twenti-
eth century, however, the stock market began to attract a flood of middle-
64. Banner, supra note 38, at 126.
65. Lawhead, supra note 43, at 215.
66. Id. at 215.
67. Id.
68. Id. (citing Cohen v. Thomas, 209 N.Y. 407, 410 (N.Y. 1913)).
69. Markham, supra note 21, at 578.
70. See Banner, supra note 38, at 131.
71. See id. at 130.
72. Kethum, supra note 18, at 207.
73. WARSHOW, supra note 14, at 338.
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class investors.74  The early twentieth century introduced middle-class
Americans to “new means of getting rich without working” through secur-
ities speculation.75  More than fifteen million Americans were stock mar-
ket investors by 1922.76  In those areas far from Wall Street, “promotional
and manipulative swindling in connection with stocks and bonds flour-
ished.”77  When novice investors were defrauded, they demanded “consti-
tutional and statutory provisions” to regulate the securities industry.78
Fraud in the securities market reached new heights during World War I
with the introduction of two schemes.  The first of these concerned “lib-
erty bonds” issued by the United States government during the war.79  No-
tably, many Americans participated in the securities market for the first
time through Liberty Bond investments.80  Unfortunately, con-men took
advantage of many of these novice investors by inducing them to exchange
their government-backed Liberty Bonds for valueless corporate stock.81
The other scheme concerned “watered stock.”82  Watered stock is “is-
sued with a value much greater than the value of the issuing company’s
assets.”83  Essentially, stock brokers would solicit substantial investments
from retail investors for a company with no assets.  Allegedly, these stocks
represented “nothing but blue sky—nothing terrestrial or tangible.”84
This notion would supply the name for the new state securities laws—the
Blue Sky Laws.
The first state to pass a Blue Sky Law was Kansas in 1911.85  Initially,
there was a great deal of enthusiasm in the states regarding the passage of
Blue Sky Laws.86  By the end of 1913, over twenty states enacted Blue Sky
74. See id. at 332.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Forrest B. Ashby, The Operation of Blue Sky Laws, 1 TEMP. L.Q. 103, 103 (1927).
78. William W. Cook, “Watered Stock” – Commissions – “Blue Sky Laws” – Stock
Without Par Value, 19 MICH. L. REV. 583, 588 (1921).
79. See WARSHOW, supra note 14, at 332.
80. See id.
81. JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM
CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS TO THE ROBBER BARONS (1492-1900) 85 (2002).
82. Cook, supra note 78, at 588.
83. Watered Stock, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/wateredstock
.asp (last visited Feb. 3, 2016).
84. Cook, supra note 78, at 590.
85. H.S. Richards, Watered Stock and Blue Sky Legislation, 2 WIS. L. REV. 86, 91-92
(1923).
86. See generally Lee. J. Perrin, The “Blue Sky Laws”, 10 BENCH & B. N.S. 483, 483-84
(1916).
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Laws of their own.87  By 1923, the count rose to forty-one,88 and by 1927,
forty-six of forty-eight states had adopted Blue Sky Laws.89
Generally, the Blue Sky Laws introduced “a prohibition under severe
penalties against selling, offering for sale, or negotiating for the sale of
securities within the state” until a filing was made.90  This requisite filing
contained information from which the designated state agency would de-
termine whether “the seller and the securities conform to certain pre-
scribed general standards.”91  It amounted to an “elaborate system of
licenses based upon inspection and examination.”92  Such a system,
though novel, was deemed appropriate because a similar approach had
been taken with respect to plumbers, pharmacists, doctors, and lawyers.93
While most states constructed similar basic licensing systems, there was
still a wide variety of experimentation from one state to another.  For ex-
ample, the laws of some states, including California, reached stockbrokers
and securities dealers.94  Others, like North Carolina, required a showing
that the business issuing the stock was “safe and solvent” before a license
would be granted.95  At least one state classified each proposed security as
either a growth or value stock and required different disclosures from issu-
ers depending on the classification of their stock.96
Before long, various plaintiffs began challenging the constitutionality
of certain states’ Blue Sky Laws.97  A 1914 case in the Northern District of
West Virginia, for example, held that the state’s Blue Sky Law was uncon-
stitutional because it imposed “a restraint and burden upon interstate
commerce.”98  Another case invalidated a Blue Sky Law on due process
grounds because the securities transactions “were not properly within the
state police power.”99  In total, six lower federal courts held Blue Sky
Laws to be unconstitutional.100
One commentator, Lee Perrin, noted that it was “in accord with prece-
dent and the workings of our government that the discovery or realization
of a prevalent economic ill should be followed by a veritable fusillade of
state laws, unworkable from a practicable standpoint and unjustifiable
87. Id.
88. See Richards, supra note 85, at 92-93.
89. See Ashby, supra note 77, at 103.
90. Perrin, supra note 86, at 484.
91. Id.
92. Richards, supra note 85, at 87.
93. Id. at 87-88.
94. Perrin, supra note 86, at 484-85.
95. Id. at 485.
96. Richards, supra note 85, at 96.
97. Perrin, supra note 86, at 486-88.
98. Bracey v. Darst, 218 F. 482, 496 (N.D. W. Va. 1914).
99. Perrin, supra note 86, at 489.
100. Ashby, supra note 77, at 103.
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constitutionally.”101  Perrin, nonetheless, believed the states would work
their way to “comparatively well-considered and practicable laws.”102
This view would prove to be correct.  By 1916, state laws had been so
amended that the Supreme Court of the United States would validate
them in a set of three opinions.103
With the question of constitutionality removed, states continued to ex-
periment with Blue Sky Laws.  One area of experimentation was in the
realm of securities market administration.  This area of securities law
sought “to prevent fraud before its perpetration by supervising, through a
state securities commission, either sellers of securities or the securities
themselves.”104  The initial results from the Kansas Blue Sky Law sug-
gested that it, in fact, did prevent fraud.  This conclusion was based on the
fact that a large number of registrants “suddenly changed their minds and
withdrew their applications” when they learned of the state’s require-
ments.105  A study from 1927 showed a “decline in both the number of
applications and the percentage of rejections,” evidence of the effective-
ness of the laws.106
The other area of experimentation was in legislation to prevent securi-
ties fraud.107  These anti-fraud laws sought to “prevent financial chicanery
by following and punishing securities swindlers.”108  Nearly all Blue Sky
Laws provided that prosecutions could be originated by the state attorney
general or a county prosecutor.109  In addition, most allowed individual
investors to bring civil actions against those who had defrauded them.110
While states seem to have been zealous in prosecuting securities market
misdeeds, records suggest that prosecutions failed because the cases were
“administered by prosecutors and courts inexperienced in corporate
finance.”111
The Blue Sky Laws were considered a step in the right direction, but it
was evident that state regulation was insufficient.  The most pressing
problems were the following: (i) states’ inability to stop fraudsters operat-
ing by mail; (ii) state and local prosecutors’ lack of necessary expertise to
101. Perrin, supra note 86, at 496.
102. Id.
103. See Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Hall v. Geiger-
Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Merrick v. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917).
104. Ashby, supra note 77, at 103-04.
105. E.R. Chapman, The Initial Financing of an Enterprise, THE BRIEF, 1912, at 211,
217.
106. Ashby, supra note 77, at 105.
107. See id. at 103-04.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 107.
110. Cf. id.
111. Id. at 103.
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successfully prosecute securities law cases; and (iii) the states’ lack of nec-
essary resources to properly monitor the secondary securities markets.112
Even where resources were sufficient, motivation to police the market
was often lacking.113  This phenomenon likely sprung from the states’ ten-
dency to write competing laws.  In fact, one commentator argued that
states were engaging in a race to the bottom in an effort to attract securi-
ties issues.114  He wrote, “The chief difficulty lies in the rivalry of the
states” attempting to attract business.115  After a while, it became appar-
ent to some that amending the existing Blue Sky Laws would not be suffi-
cient to end the practice of securities fraud.
As early as 1920, there were calls for a national solution to the growing
problem of securities fraud.116  National solutions progressed down two
distinct tracks.  One such track was the drafting and adoption by the states
of a uniform securities law.117  A uniform statute adopted by each of the
states would have solved one of the major problems of the Blue Sky era—
large offerings requiring a multistate solicitation were required to navigate
a patchwork of unique state laws.118  A uniform securities law, which
would have been widely applied and interpreted, may have also helped
courts and prosecutors develop the necessary expertise to successfully try
securities fraud cases.  The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws produced an initial draft of the Uniform Sale of Se-
curities Act in 1924.119  The act was promulgated in 1930, but was not met
with much enthusiasm by the states, and only five adopted it.120
The other track taken by those who wished to improve upon the Blue
Sky Laws was via the passage of a federal securities law under Congress’
authority to regulate interstate commerce.121  This alternative was viewed
as having three principal benefits.  First, a federal scheme should be more
effective at stopping “mail swindlers” than independent enforcement by
the states.122  Next, many believed that a federal investigatory body would
be more proficient at prosecuting sophisticated securities frauds than the
“underpaid, overworked, inexperienced, or venal district attorneys” re-
112. See id. at 111-16.
113. See Richards, supra note 85, at 91.
114. See id.
115. Id.
116. See Robert S. Stevens, Stock Issues Under the Uniform Business Corporation Act,
13 CORNELL L.Q. 399 (1928); Hearing on H.R. 188 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
66th Cong. 1 (1919) [hereinafter 1919 Hearing].
117. See Stevens, supra note 116, at 417.
118. See Ashby, supra note 77, at 111.
119. Stevens, supra note 116, at 417.
120. Richard W. Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor
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sponsible for enforcing the Blue Sky Laws.123  Third, a federal law would
present benefits to issuers, which had struggled to conduct multi-state of-
ferings under the patchwork of Blue Sky Laws.124
PART III: A FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW
The first promising attempt to pass a federal securities law was made in
1919 by Senator William S. Kenyon of Iowa.125  The proposed bill, re-
ferred to as the “Federal Stock Publicity Act,”126 regulated, by way of
federal registration, any company organized for or with the power to en-
gage in interstate commerce that wished to make an interstate offering of
shares.127  It was reported at the time that the bill was “strongly sup-
ported.”128  Indeed, President Woodrow Wilson had endorsed the bill in a
Congressional address by stating that “its adoption would serve a great
and beneficent purpose.”129
During the hearings regarding the Kenyon Bill in 1919, several state
commissioners testified in support of the national bill.  The Secretary of
State for Tennessee argued that the sale of all securities should be “super-
vised by some department of the Federal Government.”130  James R.
Young, insurance commissioner of North Carolina, testified, “I know of no
law upon our statute books that can be made of greater value to the peo-
ple than [a national securities] law.”131  Law review articles were also writ-
ten in support of a federal securities law.132  Congress, however, did not
adopt the bill due to a concern that the bill represented an unauthorized
exercise of Congress’s Article I commerce power.133
After the failure of Senator Kenyon’s bill, both interstate stock fraud
and political progressives’ desire to pass a federal securities law continued
to grow.  Accordingly, in 1922, Congressman Edward E. Denison of Illi-
nois introduced another federal securities bill.134  Congressman Denison,
cognizant of the constitutional concerns that derailed the Kenyon propo-
sal, carefully introduced his own bill to the Senate Committee on Inter-
state Commerce.  Congressman Denison articulated its constitutional
123. Ashby, supra note 77, at 114. See Watson Washburn, Control of Securities Selling,
31 MICH. L. REV. 768, 775 (1933).
124. See Ashby, supra note 77. at 111.
125. 1919 Hearing, supra note 116.
126. Id. at 3.
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129. 1919 Hearing, supra note 116, at 12.
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132. See Richards, supra note 85, at 102.
133. Regulating Sale of Securities: Hearing on H.R. 10598 Before the H. Subcomm. Of
the Comm. On Interstate Commerce, 67th Cong.11 (1922) [hereinafter 1922 Hearing].
134. Id. at 1.
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purpose, stating, “The State securities laws are sufficient to regulate the
sale of securities and prevent the sale of fraudulent and worthless securi-
ties within [the states’] respective borders, they cannot, of course, control
interstate commerce in such securities.”135  He argued that this federal se-
curities law was necessary to prevent 500 million dollars per year of fraud-
ulent securities transactions from passing through interstate commerce,
and thus, the bill was constitutionally permissible as an exercise of the
commerce power.136
To further address constitutional concerns, Denison stressed the lim-
ited nature of his bill.  In a seeming nod to the autonomy of the states and
their police forces, Denison told the Senate subcommittee that “prevent-
ing the sale of fraudulent and worthless securities is a matter that belongs
properly to the states themselves.”137  He clarified that the bill simply
made it a crime to use “mail and other agencies of interstate commerce” in
the sale of fraudulent securities.138  He noted that a more sweeping bill
calling for a federal securities commission and federal registration of se-
curities was abandoned after consultation with state regulators and indus-
try experts.139  Denison then bragged that his new bill was so limited it
would not “provide for a new bureau” or even “create a single job.”140
The Denison Bill, perhaps because of its limited nature, received
strong support from the states and the financial industry.141  The Ameri-
can Investment Bankers’ Association supported the bill.142  Both the
NYSE143 and the New York Curb Market also approved of the bill.144
Additionally, the state commissioners responsible for enforcing Blue Sky
Laws supported the Denison Bill and actively participated in its
drafting.145
Despite this support, the Denison Bill met considerable opposition.
Samuel Adams, appearing before the subcommittee as a member of the
brokerage firm Jones and Baker, believed that the act “was not a wise
one.”146  Mr. Adams stated that although it was “advocated as if it were a
gentle, lovely, remedial act,” it actually was “a very savage” act.147  He
took issue with the slate of exemptions from registration within the bill.
135. Id. at 2.
136. Id. at 3.
137. Id.
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He described the cumulative effect of the bill to be that “Wall Street . . .
can issue or do anything they choose, and other people cannot.”148  Frank-
lin Leonard Jr., appearing on behalf of the San Francisco Stock Exchange,
agreed that Wall Street was getting unreasonable exemptions from the
bill’s measures.149
During the 1920s, as the Denison Bill was under consideration in Con-
gress, securities fraud was declared “irredeemable because of the deficien-
cies of state corporate law.”150  Still, securities regulation was not a
national priority.  The majority of the nation seemed to prefer laissez-faire
economic policies, as suggested by the statement of popular president,
Calvin Coolidge, that “[t]his is a business country . . . and it wants a busi-
ness government.”151  The Denison Bill passed the House almost unani-
mously, but never made it out of the Senate Judiciary Committee.152
Although multiple bills were introduced between 1919 and 1927,153 an-
other serious attempt at passing a federal securities law was not made until
1932.154  By then, the nation had experienced a terrible stock market col-
lapse and had fallen into the period now known as the “Great Depres-
sion.”155  Between September 1, 1929 and July 1, 1932, the market
capitalization of the NYSE fell from $90 billion to $16 billion.156  In March
of 1932, with a general election ahead, both Republicans and Democrats
on the Senate Banking Committee announced their desire for “necessary
remedial legislation.”157  Even President Herbert Hoover, a staunch advo-
cate of the laissez-faire treatment of markets, called for national securities
legislation.158
While the stock market collapse put securities regulation back on the
congressional agenda, the Pecora Hearings, so-named for the counsel of
the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, Ferdinand Pecora, were in-
strumental in moving national sentiment in favor of regulatory reform
and, ultimately, federal securities legislation.159  The first witness called at
the hearings was Richard Whitney, President of the New York Stock Ex-
change, who asserted that all claims of manipulation were pure fiction.160
The very next day, Pecora called Fiorella LaGuardia, who produced docu-
148. Id. at 53.
149. Id. at 140.
150. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE
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151. Id. at 2.
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ments showing that journalists employed by both the New York Times and
Wall Street Journal had been paid to print stock-moving rumors.161  In just
two days, the credibility of the NYSE in managing securities fraud ap-
peared to have been seriously called into question before the Senate com-
mittee and the public.162  This uncertainty opened the door for
government regulation to supplant self-regulation as the primary means of
regulating of the securities industry.
As the Pecora Hearings continued, Democratic presidential candidate
Franklin D. Roosevelt “assumed a commanding position among those ad-
vocating federal securities legislation.”163  Once Roosevelt was elected
and enjoyed a strong majority in both houses of Congress, he made the
passage of a federal securities law a legislative priority.164  Unsure of the
specifics, he appointed one individual, Samuel Untermyer, and one group,
consisting of Huston Thompson, Attorney General Homer Cummings,
and Secretary of Commerce Daniel Roper, to draft competing versions of
a federal securities law.165
Untermyer produced a bill that placed enforcement power over the
interstate securities market in the United States Post Office.166  His propo-
sal found little support, and focus shifted to the work of the competing
group.  This second group proved more successful.  After reviewing the
existing Blue Sky Laws and former federal bills to draw out what were
seen as effective and well-conceived securities provisions, Huston Thomp-
son, with the aid of Attorney General Homer Cummings and Secretary of
Commerce Daniel Roper, drafted what is now known as the Securities Act
of 1933 (the “Securities Act”).167
“The initial public and congressional response was almost universally
favorable” for Thompson’s draft.168  The Wall Street Journal predicted
that “the country will insist upon its passage.”169  The bill faced a tough
fight in the House, however, with opponents claiming that that the bill was
too stringent.  Specifically, these opponents protested provisions for civil
liability for misstatements in securities registration and the ability of the
Federal Trade Commission to revoke registration upon its determination
that the registrant’s business model was not sound.170  The bill underwent
significant revisions, and the provision granting revocation power to the
Federal Trade Commission was stricken.  A revised draft was completed
161. Id. at 16-17.
162. See id.
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by April 21, 1933, that retained the provision requiring “hard-won sched-
uled items to be disclosed” in registration statements.171  Then, on May 27,
1933, the Securities Act was signed into law.172  For the first time in
United States history, the primary means of securities regulation was not
self-regulation.
In April of 1933, prior to the passage of the Securities Act, President
Roosevelt tasked the young Felix Frankfurter with helping to draft the
Securities Act.173  Frankfurter had been disappointed that Thompson’s
draft did not deal with “the mischief of peddling securities from door to
door or over the phone.”174  He was also concerned with the delegation of
legislative power to the Federal Trade Commission.175  Although he was
not able to address these issues in the Securities Act, he would get his
chance with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”).
While the Securities Act passed with not insignificant objection, the
legislative effort to pass the Exchange Act could be properly characterized
as a political brawl.  At the time, the battle was “one of the most bruising
lobbying struggles ever waged in Washington.”176  The intense debate
most likely concerned the fact that the Exchange Act acted on the NYSE
and its members directly rather than on issuers.  NYSE President Richard
Whitney responded to the proposed legislation by giving lectures, deliver-
ing radio broadcasts, and presenting congressional testimony against regu-
lation of the NYSE.177  He boldly asserted that “the Exchange is a perfect
institution.”178
On April 5, 1933, Whitney met with Roosevelt in the White House to
strike a deal.179  He argued that the NYSE could correct itself through
self-regulation if only given the opportunity.180  Unfortunately for
Whitney, in the President’s eyes, the reforms enacted by the NYSE in 1933
were too little, too late.181  Roosevelt was convinced that the Exchange
Act was necessary because NYSE members had an “inability to under-
stand the country or the public or their obligation to their fellow men.”182
Evidently, Roosevelt did not trust that self-regulation of the securities in-
dustry was sufficient to protect the investing public.
171. Id. at 65.
172. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1933).
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However, the lobbying efforts of the securities industry did have an
effect.  The initial version of the Exchange Act was withdrawn so that ad-
ditional testimony could be taken and revisions could be made.183  The
Governor of New York personally lobbied the President.184  Additionally,
the President’s own cousin, Archie Roosevelt, testified on behalf of munic-
ipal bond dealers against the bill.185
One of the revisions made to the bill to address the opponents’ criti-
cisms entailed the creation of a Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”), an agency that would have responsibility for regulating the se-
curities market.186  Ferdinand Pecora opined to the President that the Ex-
change Act would “be a good or bad law depending upon the men who
administer it.”187  Roosevelt apparently took Pecora’s view seriously.  He
responded by appointing some of the most capable people to ever lead the
SEC.188
In the six years that followed the passage of the Exchange Act, many
viewed federal regulation of the securities market as an unquestionable
success.189  In those years, “the SEC earned the reputation as one of the
most ably administered federal regulatory agencies” of the New Deal era.
190  Arguably, the SEC’s first three chairs—some of the most capable peo-
ple to ever hold the position—were responsible for the agency’s success.
The first Chairman of the SEC, Joseph P. Kennedy,191 achieved for the
commission a reputation of competence.192  The next Chairman, James
Landis, was a Harvard professor whose influence on securities legislation
and the creation of the SEC was substantial.193  After Landis, Roosevelt
appointed the future Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, William O. Douglas.194
Of the three men, it was Douglas whose “chairmanship was the most
accomplished in the SEC’s history.”195  Douglas routinely leveraged the
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power of the SEC to force the NYSE into rule changes and administrative
reorganization.196  When Richard Whitney was indicted for larceny and
arrested by Thomas E. Dewey,197 Douglas took advantage of the scandal
by getting a self-regulatory body “to police over-the-counter brokers and
dealers.”198  Ironically, Douglas’ response to the Whitney scandal marked
the beginning of a transition back toward the regime of self-regulation
found in the Buttonwood Era and preferred by the NYSE.
PART IV: A RETURN TO BUTTONWOOD
It is often written that the federal securities laws of the New Deal era
are the basis of modern securities law.199  It is more accurate, however, to
view the passage of those laws as a high-water mark or as an inflection
point in the history of American securities law.  Since the enactment of the
New Deal laws, the American securities regulatory regime has been on a
clear trajectory, returning to the supremacy of self-regulation as exper-
ienced during the Buttonwood Era.  In fact, this journey began before the
New Deal was even complete.
In hindsight, the return to self-regulation in American securities law is
not surprising.  Even while New Deal federal securities laws were under
consideration, a law review article implored readers not to overlook “pri-
vate agencies that protect the investor” because those agencies had ade-
quate rules for policing market participants and issues.200  Additionally, a
history of the NYSE written in 1929 (and commissioned by the NYSE it-
self) claimed, “its internal operation is recognized to be as careful, and the
supervision of its own members as rigid as any legal control could make
it.” 201  It seems many agreed with Richard Whitney’s claim that the
NYSE was “a perfect institution” against all evidence to the contrary.202
These views continued to be expressed after the passage of the Securities
Act and Exchange Act.203
Despite witnessing the 1929 stock market collapse and the evidence
presented in the Pecora Hearings first-hand, even some members of the
Roosevelt administration and of the SEC believed that the securities in-
dustry could effectively regulate itself.204  As early as 1935, James Landis
began to publicly float the idea of a self-regulatory agency for the securi-
196. Id. at 163.
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ties industry.205  Notably, securities brokers had already taken steps to-
ward such an agency even before the public release of Mr. Landis’
comments by leveraging the tools of the New Deal.206  Specifically, securi-
ties brokers used the National Industrial Recovery Act (“NIRA”) to get a
statutorily-approved code of fair competition and fair trade.  This code
permitted an organization called the Investment Bankers Code Commit-
tee (the “IBCC”) to serve as a quasi-official securities market police
force.207
When the Supreme Court deemed the NIRA an unconstitutional dele-
gation of legislative authority in Schechter,208 it cast grave doubt on the
legitimacy of the IBCC.  Presumably, the Schechter opinion alerted the
SEC and IBCC members to the need for change.209  Either the SEC
would need to assume the functions of the IBCC, or it would need to push
for legislation expressly allowing for self-regulation of the securities
industry.
Recent history gave little reason to believe that the best solution was
the authorization of self-regulation.  In fact, early reviews of the IBCC
showed that it had been an “ineffective policeman” for the securities in-
dustry.210  Additionally, a survey conducted by the SEC showed that fraud
among IBCC members was rampant.211  Chairman Douglas, nonetheless,
was sure that the SEC couldn’t handle the additional responsibilities of the
IBCC for two reasons.212  First, the SEC lacked the resources necessary to
monitor the everyday practices of the securities industry.213  Second,
Douglas viewed the SEC as poorly equipped, from a legal perspective, to
prescribe best practices in the “realm of ethics and morality.”214
After deciding in favor of a self-regulatory organization (“SRO”),
Chairman Douglas set to work on two courses of action to win support for
a proposal that would become known as the Maloney Act.215  Douglas
first needed to persuade Congress and President Roosevelt that a SRO
was necessary.  Secondly, he needed to persuade the securities industry to
take on this role despite the caveat of strong oversight by the SEC.
As the recession that began in 1937 continued into 1938 and federal
resources dwindled, Chairman Douglas found strong support for the Ma-
loney Act in Congress and in the White House.216  A key argument to
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winning this support was Chairman Douglas’ now-famous shotgun meta-
phor, which promised that a well-equipped SEC would be ready to act if
the SRO failed.217  Pursuing the support of the White House and Congress
before the support of the securities industry, however, turned out to be a
tactical blunder on the part of Chairman Douglas.
By January 1938, the White House and Congress had committed sup-
port to the passage of the Maloney Act and the creation of an SRO for the
securities industry.218  Sensing that Chairman Douglas now needed their
support to attain his goal of establishing an SRO, the Investment Bankers
Association (“IBA”) feigned opposition to the proposal to extract greater
power for the SRO.219  In February 1938, the president of the IBA told the
Senate Banking Committee that the idea of a securities industry SRO was
“inherently dangerous.”220  A surreal political battle ensued in which the
White House, Congress, and the SEC begged Wall Street to police
itself.221
The bill was revised considerably between January and February 1938
at the request of the IBA despite the association’s “rather close coopera-
tion” with Senator Maloney on the original draft of the bill.222  Over the
next several months, the IBA obtained provisions in the bill that granted
its Wall Street members greater latitude in the management of the
SRO.223  One of the early revisions eliminated the SEC’s “extensive
power to impose rules on the association.”224  Even after that revision was
made, the industry complained that “[t]he bill would not be self-regulating
but overregulation of an already sorely harassed industry.”225  Unless the
securities industry was offered true self-regulation, the IBA would not
support the bill.226  In light of this fact, additional concessions were made
before an agreement was reached.  The Maloney Act became law in June
of 1938 with support from the SEC and securities market organizations.227
217. See id. at 185-86 (In this metaphor, the SEC stands ready with regulatory powers
akin to a loaded shotgun should securities fraud breach the barrier of self-regulation.).
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The Maloney Act embodied a reversion to the primacy of self-regula-
tion in American securities law akin to that seen during the Buttonwood
Era.228  In 1938, for example, SEC Commissioner Mathews told the Sen-
ate Committee on Banking and Currency that the ideal regime was one in
which the industry regulated itself once more.229  The SEC hoped that the
government would exercise “appropriate supervision in the public inter-
est” yet occupy only “a residual role.” 230  Further supporting this view,
just a few months after the passage of the Maloney Act, Commissioner
Mathews announced to the annual conference of the Investment Bankers
Association of America that the SEC espoused an objective of “a mini-
mum of interference with the normal processes of business and the estab-
lishment of high professional standards of conduct and competence.”231
Mathews promised, “The industry should eventually play the predominant
role in its own regulation and development.”232
The National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) registered
as the only SRO under the Maloney Act on August 7, 1939.233  By the end
of 1939, 2,616 broker-dealer firms had joined the NASD.234  As the
NASD’s power grew, the SEC’s waned.235  In April 1939, Chairman
Douglas left the SEC to join the United States Supreme Court.236  It was
contemporaneously described as a “sad occasion,” and it ultimately
marked the moment “the SEC passed its historic zenith.”237  After Doug-
las’ departure, it became clear that the SEC would continue to lose power
with “just a handful of staff to keep up with the armies of innovators
deployed on Wall Street.”238
Chairman Douglas, in pushing for the passage of the Maloney Act, had
conceded that there would be little incentive for the SRO to police the
industry in the absence of a strong, vigilant SEC.239  Within a few years of
his departure from the Commission, the SEC was reduced “to one of the
smallest of the alphabet agencies.”240  A weakened SEC realized too late
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that it had granted “quasi-official status to a trade association that thereaf-
ter opposed—frequently successfully—further SEC legislative initia-
tives.”241  By the time the Truman administration took over, there was
already a “discernable increase in securities fraud” to which the NASD
turned a blind eye and to which the SEC had no effective response.242
Since the enactment of the Maloney Act in 1938, the securities industry
has been overseen by “a self-regulatory organization that monitored and
supervised its own trading under the sometimes cursory supervision of the
Securities and Exchange Commission.” 243  Compared to the SRO, the
SEC has “long been understaffed and outgunned.”244  This is an essen-
tially singular phenomenon in American legal history.245
In 2007, the NASD merged with the NYSE’s internal regulatory
body.246  This produced a single self-regulator for the entire securities in-
dustry for the first time.247  At the time of the merger, some argued that
the consolidation eliminated a necessary competing view in the process of
self-regulation, but that argument was summarily dismissed, leaving regu-
lation of the securities markets in the hands of a select cadre of industry
members.248  Contemporary detractors of this scheme argue that Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), the SRO that precipitated
from the merger, has established itself as the “fifth branch of the federal
government,” blurring the line between governmental and private bod-
ies.249  Most concerning is that the balance of power is continuing to move
in favor of FINRA, causing some to argue “there are forces inexorably
driving the government and the various other players into a less optimal
equilibrium.”250
While—as described in the preceding paragraph—many are concerned
with the concentration of power solely in the hands of FINRA, in the past
few years, prominent government officials have called for greater control
241. Id. at 189.
242. Id.
243. Floyd Norris, ICE Deal for NYSE Creates Global Powerhouse, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/21/business/global/ice-deal-for-nyse-creates-
global-powerhouse.html?_r=0.
244. Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 238, at 3.
245. There are many self-regulatory organizations (i.e., state bar associations and real-
tor associations). However, these self-regulatory organizations differ from the NASD in two
regards. First, they are state-specific. Second, the industries they regulate do not compare to
the size of the financial sector.
246. Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-56145, 2007 SEC
LEXIS 1640 (July 26, 2007).
247. Id. at 2-3.
248. See generally id. at 18.
249. Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 238, at 5.
250. Id.
Fall 2017] Break from Tradition 115
of the securities market by FINRA.251  SEC Commissioner Elisse Walter
told an audience that “all financial professionals should be required to be
members of one or more self-regulatory organizations . . . that are empow-
ered with both enforcement and standard setting authority and are subject
to the oversight of the Commission.”252
In fact, Commissioner Walter has delivered several strong arguments
in support of shifting even more authority to FINRA.253  Walters argued,
for example, that “[t]he SROs could handle routine examinations of finan-
cial professionals, while the Commission devoted its examination re-
sources primarily to SRO oversight and risk-based analysis, inspection,
and oversight of the industry.”  In this manner, the SEC would be stripped
of a great deal of its current powers and relegated to special investigations
that require the utilization of the resources of a federal agency.254  An
alleged advantage to this arrangement is that FINRA faces fewer con-
straints than the SEC, allowing it the “authority to establish ethical as well
as legal standards.”255  Moreover, Walters has argued that the SEC’s lim-
ited resources make it incapable of fulfilling its oversight functions of the
complex and growing market.256  One wonders, of course, how an SEC
that is incapable of understanding the complexities of an industry could
possibly be competent to perform risk analysis and conduct inspections.
This is the sort of logical inconsistency routinely exhibited by supporters of
SROs.
In sum, the overarching theme of Walters’ proposal is that effective
oversight of the securities markets can be had if FINRA is given a greater
role because of its proximity to the market and its possession of the exper-
tise necessary to fill the “oversight gap.”257  Although this familiar argu-
ment is unsupported by historical evidence or reason, it seems to always
enjoy support at the highest levels of the federal government.258  Even the
“proponents of heightened financial regulation may celebrate the prospect
of more powerful and governmental SROs.”259  For instance, Bernie
Sanders and Elizabeth Warren, recognized as the harshest critics of Wall
Street in today’s U.S. Senate, have never once publicly questioned the pri-
macy of self-regulation.  In fact, Senator Warren has repeatedly attacked
251. Speech by SEC Commissioner: Regulating Broker-Dealers and Investment Advis-
ers: Demarcation or Harmonization? By Commissioner Elisse B. Walter, SEC (May 5, 2009),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch050509ebw.htm [hereinafter Walters Speech].
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the SEC; in turn, such criticism seemingly strengthens Wall Street’s ability
to self-regulate with minimal oversight.260  It is time to stop this progres-
sion.  It is time to re-examine the fundamentals of American securities
law; it is time to examine the utility and the necessity of self-regulation.
Professor Emily Hammond, an expert in administrative law, recently
described the system of self-regulation as one that “undermines accounta-
bility and fails to adequately guard against arbitrariness.”261  The primary
issue is that agencies like the SEC “are deferential either in practice or as
a matter of statutory design to both rules and orders originating from
SROs.”262  The problem is compounded by the deference given by the
courts to the agencies, creating a “double deference” to SROs with “nu-
merous incentives to dampen participation of statutory beneficiaries, en-
gage in anticompetitive conduct toward weaker members, and ratchet
regulatory law toward the lowest common denominator.”263  All of this is
carried out by an entity (i.e., FINRA) that, given its private nature, is
neither transparent nor accommodating to public comment.264
Though the primacy of self-regulation in American securities law has
proven to be enduring, it is not unchangeable.  In fact, this country’s foun-
dational securities laws contain provisions that envision a rebalancing of
power from FINRA to the SEC.  For example, the Exchange Act contem-
plates a process by which SROs must file rules with the SEC that would
then be reviewed, subjected to notice and comment procedures, and fi-
nally scrutinized by the SEC.265  The problem, however, lies in the work-
ing practices of the SEC under this law.  The SEC is deferential to such a
degree that it rarely, if ever, disapproves a FINRA rule.266  Between 2009
and 2011, only once did the SEC disapprove of a rule promulgated by the
authority.267  Notably, those rules carry with them the force of law.268
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obama-fire-sec-chief-mary-jo-white-1476439200 (The methods employed by Senator Warren
raise the question of whether the former professor of U.S. Constitutional law has a basic
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The view espoused by this paper, that the role of self-regulation is a
historical accident in need of a fundamental reimagining, is hardly unique.
There are many proposals for adjusting the balance of power between the
SEC and FINRA.  In a report prepared by the Boston Consulting Group
in 2011, the SEC was advised to re-think its relationship with FINRA and
practice more thoughtfulness both in its communications with the SRO
and its review of rules.269  The creation of an oversight committee, either
at the congressional or agency level, has also been suggested.270  Others
have resorted simply to praying or hoping that FINRA will reform itself
sua sponte to eliminate its shortcomings.271  Even the threatened use of
the “nuclear option”, whereby the SEC would exercise its right to relieve
FINRA of any responsibility given to it by statute, has been suggested to
encourage greater diligence in self-regulation.272  I would advocate a dif-
ferent approach.  I propose that the SEC actually exercise its rights under
the Exchange Act to break from tradition and relieve FINRA of most of
its responsibilities.273  For the first time in recent memory, there are signs
that the SEC may be open to this proposal.274
There would, of course, be objections to overthrowing the tradition of
self-regulation, and those should be addressed.  There are three main ar-
guments in favor of the primacy of self-regulation.  The first argues that
the SEC lacks the expertise to regulate Wall Street.275  This defect can
easily be overcome by proper recruiting and retention practices; in fact,
many other agencies that regulate significant industries already employ
such techniques.  The Food and Drug Administration, for example, em-
ploys scientists and physicians to regulate the pharmaceutical industry
rather than relying on self-regulation of pharmaceutical companies.276
While the financial sector is admittedly complex, it would be difficult to
argue that it is more complex than the scientific pharmaceutical industry.
Next, proponents of sustaining the primacy of self-regulation in the se-
curities market argue that SROs are more “nimble” and “efficient” in re-
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have “force and effect of a federal regulation”).
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sponding to misconduct.277  Facts suggest that the SEC is, in fact, quite
capable of action.  For instance, the SEC has finalized 204 rules related to
the Dodd-Frank Act alone.278  Additionally, the SEC has led all federal
agencies in terms of the quantity of finalized major rules since 2009.279
Further, the SEC has set a record for enforcement actions each of the past
two years.280  If given greater resources, there is every reason to believe
the SEC could be sufficiently nimble and efficient.
The final argument I’ve noted for maintenance of the status quo is that
the SEC does not have the requisite resources to monitor the securities
market.  The solution to this quandary is simply a matter of raising reve-
nue.  Currently, FINRA members finance FINRA’s operations through a
myriad of fees.281  A tax or licensing fee could be introduced that would
shift the funds currently flowing from securities firms to FINRA to the
SEC instead.  This should not lead to any greater financial burden being
placed on securities firms.  In fact, elimination of the rubber-stamp rela-
tionship between the self-regulatory agency and the SEC, thereby elimi-
nating a layer of resource-consuming oversight, may actually save the
regulated entities time and money (and deliver better returns to investors
by extension).
CONCLUSION
The securities laws of the United States support a securities industry
that touches the lives of Americans in countless ways and influences
events around the globe.  Yet, the most enduring principal of American
securities law, self-regulation, is a notoriously ineffective tradition rooted
in a one-paragraph contract between twenty-four men seeking to avoid the
effects of an eighteenth-century state law.  A thoughtful examination of
the primacy of self-regulation in American securities law is long overdue.
Where history or logic lead to the conclusion that self-regulation is inade-
quate, we must break from tradition.  Such severance can be accomplished
by leveraging existing laws to reclaim regulatory authority properly held
by Congress and the SEC.  Only by engaging in this examination and rec-
lamation of regulatory authority can the effectiveness of American securi-
ties laws be optimized.
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